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ABSTRACT
The American Expeditionary Forces in World War I: The Rock
of the Marne
by
Stephen Coode

American participation in the First World War developed
slowly throughout 1917 to a mighty torrent during the last
six months of the war. United States participation
undoubtedly helped not only repel but to stop all German
assaults on the Western Front: it had substantially aided
in defeating Imperial Germany.

Through primary and secondary sources a timeline, as well
as a few of the more significant events, has been
established following the United States’ involvement in the
war. Special attention has been focused on the United
States Third Infantry Division and its part in the July 1517, 1918 Second Battle of the Marne.

The Third Infantry Division would see the war throughout
its remaining battles and aid in the occupation of Germany.
However, it is most famous for the Marne battle.
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CHAPTER 1
TRAINING AND PREPARATION, A.E.F.
Formally declared by the United States Congress on 6
April 1917, war against the Imperial German government and
its military forces, for the United States, would be a war
unlike America theretofore had ever prosecuted. In 1917
Germany had once again begun its unrestricted submarine
warfare, resulting in severed ties between the United
States and Germany: the German ambassador in Washington,
Count von Bernsdorf, was dismissed and unless Germany was
willing to halt its submarine forces President Wilson would
refuse further negotiations. Due to the German High
Commands opinion of the U.S. being weak and inefficient--it refused to restrict its submarines---it had unknowingly
sown its demise.
As a result of the illegal British blockade of
Germany, the German High Command in February 1915
promulgated a blockade of its own around the British Isles.
Since the U.S. had strong economic ties with Great Britain,
it was likely there would be in the future a U.S.
confrontation with Germany. Germany viewed the sinking of
merchant vessels as self defense due to the manner in which
Great Britain detained ships: if Great Britain could stop
commerce and trade by blocking neutral countries shipping

4

with Germany, the Germans could do the same with countries
trading with Great Britain. However, Germany had been
forewarned by the U.S. that if any U.S. shipping or the
lives of its citizens were lost due to German interference,
the U.S. would hold Germany directly accountable for such
losses. The U.S. would suffer losses of shipping and its
citizens, notably the Lusitania in 1915, for the next two
years. The entrance of the United States in World War I can
therefore be directly linked to the German High Command’s
failure in restricting its unrestricted submarine warfare
against American shipping, the Zimmerman Telegram of
February 1917, and the ever increasing mortality rate of
American sea merchants.
In late April 1917, British and French leaders sailed
to the United States for talks with American government
officials concerning America’s active participation in the
war. The American effort was paramount to Allied success:
the weary French troops and a shortage of British manpower
at the close of 1917, as well as their lack of reserves and
resources, made clear their ill equipped forces could not
meet the demands of another year of warfare on the Western
Front. All parties involved agreed the U.S. must do
something to lessen the strain on the Allies and in May
1917 General John J. Pershing was selected to command the

5

American Expeditionary Force.

1

Pershing was, at the outset

and without exception, given full and total control of the
AEF: it would not be Washington, Paris, or London
commanding the Americans, it would be only Pershing.2
President Wilson and Secretary of War Newton D. Baker would
provide Pershing full directives as how best to conduct the
AEF; essentially, Pershing would have full discretion on
how best to use American troops to implement those
directives.
Pershing’s extensive command authority by necessity,
however, dictated that he must cooperate with the French
and British governments as well as their field commanders;
and not just with the French and British but his overall
mission was to cooperate with all Allied countries in their
functions against Imperial Germany. First, though, General
Pershing would need the necessary manpower to fill the
fledgling AEF.
Before 1917 the U.S. armed forces was nowhere near the
500,000 men the Selective Service Act, passed on 19 May
1917 called for; upon entering the war the regular army of
the U.S. was composed of roughly 130,000 men and the

1

Thomas Fleming, “Iron General,” in The Great War: Perspectives
on The First World War, ed. Robert Cowley (New York: Random House,
2003), 411.
2
Thomas G. Frothingham, The American Reinforcement in The World
War (New York: Books for Libraries Press, 1927; reprint, 1971), 77.
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National Guard contained around 67,000 troops. The SSA
called for an army of 500,000 men and, if needed, more men
would be made available through the draft. With voluntary
enlistments and the ongoing draft the U.S. armed forces, by
the end of hostilities in November 1918, would reach
4,000,000 men. The enlargements of the Regular U.S. Army as
well as the National Guard were the primary reasons for the
SSA. Nevertheless, the 4,000,000 combined U.S. servicemen
at war’s end are simply astonishing: the American people’s
willingness to take part in the war---to voluntarily fill
the ranks of a badly needed military force--was
unprecedented in U.S. history.3
Started in 1915 by General Leonard Wood, the
Plattsburg Plan was initiated for the training of the
volunteers; surprisingly, most of the men who volunteered
were professionals and businessmen. Some of the
professional soldiers tasked with training those men were
veterans of the recent campaign in Mexico; both regular
Army and National Guardsmen, commanded by Pershing, had
been sent to the Texas-New Mexico border with Mexico to
repel border crossings and raids by Mexican bandits. The
benefits of these experiences for the building and training

3

Girard Lindsley McEntee, Military History of The World War (New
York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1943), 368-369.
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of a large national defense force were immediately
apparent: the improved efficiency of the regular Army as
well as the National Guard would greatly aid in the
training of the volunteers and, moreover, increased the
morale of the fighting men. As will be shown later, the
camaraderie and morale of America’s fighting men would be
put to the test when Operation Michael, the great German
offensive of spring 1918, would bring the U.S. Third
Infantry Division face to face with a powerful German army.
Aside from the above stated informal directives from
Secretary of War Newton D. Baker about how Pershing was to
assume his duties, a more formal set of instructions from
Baker followed on 26 May 1917:

In military operations against the Imperial German Government
you are directed to cooperate with the forces of the other
countries employed against the enemy; but in so doing the
underlying idea must be kept in view that the forces of the United
States are a separate and distinct component of the combined
forces, the identity of which must be preserved. This fundamental
rule is subject to such minor exceptions in particular
circumstances as your judgment may approve. The decision as to
when your command or any of its parts is ready for action is
confided to you, and you will exercise full discretion in
determining the manner of cooperation. But until the forces of the
United States are, in your judgment, sufficiently strong to
warrant operations as an independent command, it is understood
that you will cooperate as a component of whatever army you may be
assigned to by the French Government.4

4

U.S. Historical Division, Department of The Army: Office of
Military History, United States Army in The World War, 1917-1919, vol.
1 (Washington, D.C.: GPO, 1948), 3.
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The Third United States Infantry Division originated
in North Carolina, its troops arriving from eleven
different posts throughout the U.S. Totaling in excess of
27,714 men and officers by 18 September 1918, the 3rd ID was
at the apex of its divisional capabilities: it would never
again exceed that number throughout the war.

5

It must be

remembered that the U.S./AEF divisional strength and
organization far exceeded those of the French and British.
The typical Continental differences in divisional strength
were---and rightly so---a major concern for the Allied
commanders. A single American Infantry Division, 28,000 men
and officers, posed serious problems to the logistics and
supply network already established in France: a single
division alone would consume enormous quantities of
supplies, require a vast network of supply lines and
transportation, and need large port facilities as well as
bases and access to railroads. Therefore, the American
reliance on French artillery, airplanes, and other weapons
and supplies caused considerable logistical problems at the
onset of American involvement.
The French and British armies had set timetables and
formulae based on the size of their divisions. The

5

Gaul, Jeffrey. History of The Third Infantry Division: Rock of
The Marne (Kentucky: Turner Publishing, 1988), 12.
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unusually large American formations disrupted these
calculations: for example, how long it would take a
division to march a certain number of miles, using a
certain length of road; the number of railroad cars needed
for the transport of an entire American division; and,
possibly the most important factor, the logistical concerns
of supplying an entire AEF division. Despite French and
British demands to Baker concerning the size of U.S.
divisions, Baker, believing Pershing to be competent, not
to mention Commander in Chief in France, “would not deviate
from a principle [Pershing’s proposed divisional strength]
which he knew was sound.”6
As previously mentioned, the Third United States
Infantry Division was a hodgepodge of army units from posts
throughout the U.S. Of the 27,714 men and officers
comprising the 3rd, the infantry was broken down into the 5th
and 6th Brigades and further divided into the 4th and 7th
Infantry Regiments as well as the 9th Machine Gun Battalion.
There were artillery units, as well: the 10th Field
Artillery Regiment (75mm) from Arizona as well as the 76th
from Hattiesburg, Mississippi and the 105mm Artillery Unit
from Texas. Topping off the field artillery units was a

6

Frederick Palmer, Newton D. Baker: America at War, vol. 1 (New
York: Dodd, Mead & Co., 1931), 255.

10

trench mortar battery and, finally, the 7th Machine Gun
Battalion, 5th Field Signal Battalion, and the 6th Engineer
and Headquarters unit. The Sixth Engineers were the first
of the division to arrive in France and, ironically, would
be the first troops of the division engaged in combat on
the continent: engineers, theoretically, were not usually
the first to go into combat.7
On 28 May 1917 General Pershing left the U.S. and
headed for Paris. Accompanied by a small staff he set up
his headquarters in Paris, where he went to work planning
the overall combined effort the AEF was to play in the war.
Visualizing that the AEF would eventually number around
three million men on the continent, he set about planning
how to organize, train, house, and maintain the forces he
envisioned taking to the fight. But first he had to find a
solution for the transport of such a large force and,
moreover, had to factor into that equation the British and
French resources available at the time. When the U.S.
entered the war, she was not a leading naval power: the
French and British dominated the earth’s oceans. In a
cablegram he sent on 6 July 1917 Pershing evaluated, in
part:

7

Gaul, 12.
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Plans should contemplate sending over at least 1,000,000 men
by next May….Inasmuch as question affects all allies whose
common interests demand that we exert maximum military power
consistent with transport problem, suggest early agreement be
reached among Allies which would provide requisite
transportation.8

Soon after arriving in France Pershing proposed to the
U.S. War Department his recommendation for the overall
organization and logistics of the AEF. Four specific
projects comprised the organizational recommendation: 1)
the General Organizational Project, 2) Service of the Rear
Project, 3) the Tank Project and 4) the Schedule of
Priority of Shipments. The above cablegram indicates the
urgent need for immediate approval of the recommendation,
which was given on 11 July 1917. Upon completion of a joint
study, headed by Colonel Chauncey Baker and including staff
officers of Pershing's top subordinate commanders, as well
as the War Department as a whole, the final outcome was an
organized, balanced American force suitable for fighting a
modern war.9
The first major contingent of the AEF set sail for
Europe on 12 June 1917. Led by General William L. Sibert,
the First Expeditionary Division would provide the basis
for an American army that by the end of the war would
constitute forty-three American divisions. Thirty-two camps

8

U.S. Historical Division, vol. 1, 4.
Ibid.
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would be established throughout the U.S. for mobilization
and training purposes; from medical personnel to machine
gunners, training policy was set in 1917 for a period of
sixteen weeks. What astonished Pershing about the training
the men were receiving was that there was at first no
emphasis on individual rifle marksmanship, and that it was
geared for small-unit training with no provisions for
training as a combined, large-unit arms team. Moreover,
training was emphasized in trench warfare. For Pershing and
his desire for mobile, non-static combat, trench warfare
training simply would not do: the American soldier needed
mobility, traversing barbed-wire and pushing the enemy from
his trenches and fighting them in open space with bayonet
and rifle, if he were to succeed in his fight against the
Boche.10 The need for mobilizing the American forces was
only one significant dimension of America’s involvement in
the war: the mobilization of the American economy in time
of war was another. However, the economy would prove much
more difficult to mobilize than would the American forces.11
The Council of Defense was formed in 1916 after the
National Defense Act was enacted the same year: a concern
of American military thought for over a century,
10

“Passing Troops Over Wire Entanglements,” File 203-53. RG 120.
U.S. Army Center of Military History, “ The U.S. Army in World
War I, 1917-1918” (6 March 2008) www.history.army.mil/books/amhv2/PDF/chapter01.pdf (accessed 9 September 2006).
11
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mobilization and training of American manpower and industry
was not necessarily new to the military---or economic--leadership. The War Industries Board replaced the outdated
Munitions Standard Board, made up of civilian as well as
military representatives for the purpose of coordinating,
prioritizing, creating new industry as well as converting
the existing manufacturing companies to a wartime status,
and producing materials for the army and the navy. Bernard
Baruch would lead the War Industries Board in expediting
the much needed economic and industrial might of the United
States.
Even with the tremendous effort by Baruch to
coordinate and encourage the production and development of
weapons, the demand for those weapons was so great and
immediate that, consequently, the AEF would depend heavily
on Allied (especially French) weapons, particularly tanks,
airplanes, and artillery. However, small and individual
arms productions in the United States as well as uniform
and food distribution methods were much more successful in
supplying the AEF. Many top military officials, such as
Major General George W. Goethals, relied heavily on
businessmen-turned-soldiers like Charles G. Dawes and
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William W. Atterbury12, the A.E.F.’s General Purchasing
Agent in Europe and supervisor of the A.E.F.’s
transportation system, respectively.13
Pershing moved his General Headquarters in September
1917 to Chaumont where, centrally located to where the
planned American Front lines would presumably be
established, he and his staff would supervise the training
of American troops. By the Fall of 1917, there were four
divisions----the 1st, 2nd, 26th, and 42nd---as well as a
brigade of U.S. Marines in France and all needed, among
other things, trench, chemical, demolition, mortar, and
grenade training. As mentioned above, the entire AEF would
need advanced bayonet and rifle training. Men such as
Corporal James B. Gresham, Private Thomas F. Enright, and
Private Merle D. Hay might have survived, had they received
proper training, a German raid on a trenchline they shared
with their French allies, but they did not: they were the
first three deaths of the AEF’s campaign in Europe.14
On 21 March 1918 Chateauvillain was designated as
headquarters of the U.S. Third Infantry Division. Known as
the Ninth Area for Billeting and Training, it was made

12

Army and Navy, “Pershing’s A.E.F” (11 May 1931)
http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,741623,00.html
(accessed 15 February 2008).
13
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 23-24.
14
U.S. Army Center of Military History, 21-26.
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available to the 3rd ID as an area of concentration for
training the division’s troops. The area encompassed 300
square miles, contained some lowland as well as high
ground, and occupied the west-central territory of HauteMarne, located some 10 miles west of Chaumont where the AEF
headquarters was located. As means of transport and
equipment became available, and coupled with the arrival of
troops, means of organization, training, and instruction
began to give the division a semblance of a cohesive
fighting force.15 Command of the division was entrusted to
Major General Joseph T. Dickman. Back in the U.S., Dickman
had commanded Camp Greene in North Carolina and was
promoted to command the 3rd ID in late November, 1917.
Before the war he was present with Pershing in Cuba in
1898, and later was Inspector General on Pershing’s staff;
he was an instructor for several military schools teaching
organization, strategies and tactics, and military history.
Overall, Dickman was well prepared for his eventual
participation in Europe in April, 1918.16
The 4th, 7th, 38th, and 30th infantry regiments of the 3rd
ID arrived by 21 April and a final schedule for the full
training of the division arrived from army headquarters on
15

Joseph T. Dickman, The Great Crusade (New York: D. Appleton and
Company, 1927), 36-38.
16
John J. Pershing, foreword to The Great Crusade, by Joseph T.
Dickman (New York: D. Appleton and Company, 1927), vii-viii.
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the 28th. In poor condition and looking haggard, horses from
the French Army arrived for divisional use on 2 May; in
order to bring the horses to operational use, items such as
housing (stables), food, water, and other necessities vital
for the health and maintenance of the very important
animals were needed. Unimportant to untrained eyes, the
horses were valuable as a means to wage an early 20th
century war. Moreover, the accomplishments of the 3rd ID in
regard to their treatment and training of their horses, as
well as the speedy construction of the animals’ facilities,
were two not insignificant achievements of the division
that was to make its reputation as the ‘Rock of The Marne’.
Continued favorable weather conditions of those early days
in France permitted the division’s training to progress
smoothly; this was fortunate for the French and British,
being beaten back as they were during the German Michael
Offensive launched back in March.
For the 3rd ID the sequence of events now became rapid.
The division, premised on the assumption of trench warfare
training, was to be moved to a quiet sector near Toul; on
28 May it was to relieve the U.S. 28th Division at Boucq. By
the 31st it had been recalled to the Vosges, between Thann
and St. Die. The Germans tempestuous progress toward and
approaching the Marne River would necessitate yet another

17

move for the division: the move would take the 3rd to
immediate field service and combat, as will be discussed
later in the narrative.17
In his book, Dickman shared his thoughts concerning
the Allied position and how they planned to use American
soldiers within their own armies: “…Upon landing in
England, March 13, 1918…the question was already a year
old.” He continues:

According to the original plan we were to send
over thousands of expert workmen to labor for the
French; and such soldiers as we might send were to be
put into French battalions, losing their identity…and
being controlled entirely by French officers….
To suppose that liberty-loving
Americans would take kindly to serving in a
subordinate capacity in a foreign country, in a
foreign uniform and under a foreign flag, with foreign
officers commanding them in an unknown language, was
going far.

During a conference in March 1918 at Abbeville, aware of
the new German drive of the 21st, Pershing allowed some
flexibility of American troops but never wavered from his
static policy of an independent American Army. In the end
the conferees of the meeting agreed that “It is the opinion
of the Supreme War Council that in order to carry out the
war to a successful conclusion, an American Army should be

17

Dickman, 44-47.
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formed as soon as possible under its own commander and
under its own flag.”18
General Pershing met with a delegation from Paris
first in the U.S. and again a few months later upon his
arrival in France in June 1917; both meetings centered on
the question of how American troops could best be used;
however, the meeting in France was slightly altered. The
original plan called for transporting from the U.S. to
France thousands of skilled workers for employment by the
French; also included in the provision was a plan to send
U.S. combat troops for the sole purpose of reinforcing
French battalions, to bring them up to their regular
battalion strength. The British requested similar
deployments from the AEF. What was neither debatable nor
questionable in Pershing’s opinion was that, after being
deployed and enveloped by British and French armies,
American troops would almost certainly lose their identity
while under the command of British and French officers. For
Dickman, the British and French demands were seen as having
a total lack of respect for the American Army and “the
dignity of the American nation and of an imposition on our
good nature.” He goes on to say:

18

Dickman, 255-259.
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Vast financial and material assistance had
already been rendered to the Allies under very
‘benevolent’ neutrality. Although thus encouraged, it
still required a good deal of assurance to make a
proposal so far from flattering to our national pride,
especially on the part of the British, who did not use
soldiers from other parts of their Empire, as little
prepared for war as we were, namely, Canadians,
Australians and New Zealanders, to fill up the
depleted ranks of their Tommies.19

While most diligently appealing for the systemization
of an exclusive AEF which, incidentally, could not be
intelligently refuted, Pershing’s goals were to be
postponed due to a German offensive that began in March,
1918. Pershing’s relentless goal of an exclusive AEF would
be, as a first step, secured under the London Agreement.
The agreement, enacted 24 April 1918, stipulated that upon
the completion of U.S. Army Division and Corps training
they shall be organized, used, and commanded by Americans.
The Supreme War Council agreed that the U.S. should, as
soon as possible, form its own army under its own command
and flying its own flag. Prior to the London Agreement, on
6 March 1918, the chief of the French mission with the
American Army, General Ragueneau, issued his own report
regarding the formation of an entirely independent American
Army:

19

Ibid.
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Another consequence of this state of mind is that
all the Americans contemplate the formation of an army
purely American, without mixture with the other
Allies. They are unanimous on this point….They do not
wish to hear any talk about an amalgamation in which
the American Army would lose its personality. They are
all opposed to it and are supported by American public
opinion….
The last instructions from Washington are
too positive, and correspond too closely to the
unanimous sentiment of the American people and their
Army, for us to be able to do anything by insisting:
we would only develop a useless tension.20

After General Max von Boehm’s Seventh Army destroyed
three French divisions at Chemin de Dames on 27 May 1918
there was, again, a mass exodus of people fleeing Paris.
This emergency, even in the face of the London Agreement,
allowed Foch (Commander in Chief of the Supreme War
Council) to take immediate, albeit temporary, control of
American forces. This development pushed the European
commanders to contact Washington directly, through their
respective governments, to try and persuade the U.S.
Government to turn over their forces to Foch’s control and
even, if possible, to have Pershing removed as AEF
Commander.
The French commander’s insistence on overall command,
however, proved to be futile. As at the very outset of U.S.
involvement, U.S. leaders were unwavering in their stance

20

Dickman, 258-259.
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of an independent AEF. The emergency did not call for
Foch’s temporary command over some U.S. divisions, which
were scattered for miles among French and British troops;
the move benefited no Allied army and provided the AEF with
no significant instructions and only added to further
dispersion of U.S. troops. The day would come, however,
when AEF troops would be fighting under their own flag and
following the orders of American commanders.21
Realizing in early 1918 that the unrestricted
submarine warfare, indiscriminately relaunched in February
1917, was not working and had indeed failed, Ludendorff and
Hindenburg, wrongly assuming it would take the United
States at least six months to arrive in force on the
European mainland, concluded that it was time either to
defeat the Entente---once and for all---or be defeated
themselves. Ludendorff and Hindenburg, preparing a final
plan for a decisive strike, had several reasons to foresee
a successful outcome. The Russian revolution made available
the immediate transfer of German manpower to the Western
Front; the Italian’s miserable showing at Caporetto forced
the British and French to send troops to stabilize the
Italian front; the so called French mutinies of 1917
reduced French effectiveness; massive British losses at
21

Dickman, 260-261.
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Passchendale in 1917 had produced a crisis in the British
war effort; and, in general, a serious decline in Allied
manpower were all good reasons the German high command had
for launching a final, all out assault on the Western
Front.
Tim Travis, a contributing author in Hew Strachan’s
World War I: A History, opines on the Allied victories on
the Western Front and how, in six critical places, “The
Allied victories on the western front in 1918 really
occurred.” He continues:

These were, first, halting the massive German
1918 Spring offensives; secondly, mounting the
decisive French counter-offensive at the Marne on
18 July; thirdly, the successful
Australian/Canadian/British
Amiens offensive of 8 August; fourthly, the
continuing arrival of the American Expeditionary
Force (AEF); fifthly, the sweeping allied
Offensives of late September; and lastly, the
final allied pursuit of the retreating German army
in October and early November, leading to the
armistice of 11 November 1918.22

22

Hew Strachan, World War I: A History (New York, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 1998), 278.
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CHAPTER 2
ROCK OF THE MARNE
Appearing behind the forward positions of the German 1st
Army, just Northeast of Reims, Kaiser Wilhelm on the
evening of 14 July 1918 was awaiting the German H-Hour to
cross the Marne River: a German surprise attack with Paris
as its objective. However, there was to be no such surprise
at all. In the mid-evening of the 14th a company of French
infantry made a daring raid across no-mans-land and
straight into German forward posts, bagging twenty-seven
German prisoners and, most importantly, intelligence
documents stating times and places of impending German
attacks. Word of the imminent attack was passed up and down
the Allied front line via runners and telephone, passing
along the urgent message to command posts and elements of
the French Fourth Army. There would be no German surprise
attack. Comprised of the German 10th and 36th Divisions of
the German Seventh Army, the most concentrated and heaviest
attack would fall upon the American Third Infantry Division
and the French 125th Division, which was to the right of the
U.S. 3rd ID.23 The attack of 15 July 1918 marked the last
major German offensive of the war; from 18 July until the

23

Joseph Gies, Crisis 1918 (New York: W.W. Norton & Co., 1974), 204-205.
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Armistice, the Allied forces would assume all subsequent
offensives.24
Throughout 1917 Allied commanders anticipated certain
German offensives to begin in the spring and summer of
1918; the Germans, indeed, were preparing operational plans
for a “Great Offensive” in the spring of 1918. Not to be a
decisive, knockout blow, but instead to split the British
and French forces and in the process deal a staggering
defeat to the British, Operation Michael called for a
series of five individual operations stretching across the
northern part of the Western Front. The leading German
commanders Paul von Hindenburg and General Erich von
Ludendorff decided at a conference on 27 December 1917 for
the go ahead to begin making preparations for the offensive
with code names such as “George I” and “George II”, “Mars”,
“Michael I, II, III”, “Castor and Pollux” (Verdun), and
“Strassburg”; the Germans launched the main attack,
Michael, on 21 march 1918.25 The initial drive was
spearheaded by the German Third, First, Ninth, and Seventh
Armies of the German Crown Prince Rupprecht’s Army Group.26
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By early summer the German drive had stalled at the
approach to Paris.
By the first of July 1918, however successful (but
not decisive) the first four German drives had been,
political unrest and discontent in Germany thus far in the
war was at its zenith. Not unaware of these political
developments, the German military commanders realized full
well the importance of victory on the fifth and final
assault against the Marne salient. The German objective,
besides maintaining the initiative and capturing French
prisoners and material, was twofold: take the rail hub of
Reims and thereby control the railway running southwest to
Chateau-Thierry, giving the German army more room to
maneuver and, the second, seize Paris.27
By 15 July 1918 sixteen American divisions on the
Western Front were disposed among various British and
French armies along a line stretching from the English
Channel through Montdidier to Chateau-Thierry; through
Reims, Verdun, and the St. Mihiel Salient, ending at the
Swiss frontier at Basel.28 Six of these American divisions
were in such a position to defend Paris via ChateauThierry. Around the same time in July American troops were
27
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arriving in France at the rate of about 10,000 per day;
theretofore a few of the A.E.F.’s divisions had seen some
form of combat and proved their worthiness on the
battlefield, while other AEF forces needed more time to be
trained. After training they would be moved to a sector of
the line where it was thought fighting would be imminent.
Extracted information from captured German prisoners
revealed an attack by the Boche was set to begin at
midnight on the 15th; this pertinent information would lead
to serious German casualties and resulted in further
demoralization of the German invaders. These casualties
were a result of a spoiling offensive by Allied batteries
initiated around 11:50 p.m. on the 14th, just ten minutes
before the German attack was set to begin.
What would later be known as the last major German
offensive of the war opened up around 12:10 a.m. as German
gas rounds and explosive artillery shells were fired onto
Allied lines. The more than eighty German batteries facing
the 3rd ID continued to fire up and down the front for more
than three hours.

Reaching as far back as seven miles in

depth, German artillery was moved forward 300 yards to
permit the first waves of German infantry to commence their
attack, crossing in boats and under fire, trying to gain a
foothold on the southern bank of the Marne. This
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devastating German artillery continued, at different
sections of the line at one time or another, for ten
straight hours: rolling barrages commenced and around 3:50
a.m. as the German batteries, with distances of
approximately 165 yards and time rotations from seven to
twelve minutes, depending on the terrain, harassed the men
of the 3rd ID with great effect.29
Adding to the maddening artillery fire the first wave
of enemy troops the 3rd encountered by no means consisted of
reserve or green German soldiers. They were “shock troops”,
the original Stormtroopers: those troops who would harass
and interdict who were young, tough, strong, and battlehardened---the Stosstruppen.30
In the fifth and last German offensive of Operation
Michael, Ludendorff had two objectives in mind, the first
being minimal compared to the second (possibly the most
important objective of all five offensives). If things went
well enough and according to his plan, Ludendorff believed
the second objective---the capture of Paris---could be
achieved only by seizing the Surmelin Valley. The valley,
near the town of Moulin, was the only gap, running along
the south bank of the Marne in an east-west direction,
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capable of supporting a large modern army. It was in this
valley where Major General Joseph Dickman’s 3rd ID was
holding the line, directly in front of Ludendorff.
The United States Third Infantry Division was attached to
General Jean DeGoutte’s Fifth French Army and, with it, two
Italian divisions plus the American 28th Division. The
French Fifth Division was on Dickman’s eastern flank;
combined, these forces would play a highly significant part
in that sector of fighting but, alone, the American 3rd ID
would play a crucial role in the defense of the Surmelin
Valley.31
Deploying the division on 30 May, Dickman skillfully
positioned his forces in depth: he ordered two infantry
regiments to the bank of the Marne that was closest to his
position and held two more in reserve, where they would
sometime later be moved up to the Marne to join the two
infantry regiments already there. Dickman would follow up
his defense by ordering the division’s 4th Infantry Regiment
to Chateau-Thierry; the 4th would later be joined by the 7th
and 30th Infantry Regiments. Dickman placed the 38th Infantry
at the point where the Surmelin River joined the Marne, in
direct opposition to the German 10th Division. The 38th and
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30th, either by fate or by consequence, were the two
infantry regiments of the 3rd ID that would eventually be
tasked with holding the valley. These regiments, commanded
by Colonel Ulysses Grant McAlexander and Colonel Edward
Luther Butts, respectively, would be responsible for the
division’s leap into history.32
Colonel Butts graduated from West Point in 1890,
making him one of the youngest regimental commanders in the
AEF. Detail oriented and thorough, he was respected by his
colleagues and considered an icon by, and to, his troops.
He had a professional and somewhat friendly relationship
with McAlexander. These two commanders and their men would
not only make the difference in halting the German advance,
but also would make a lasting impact on the initially
negative German opinions of not just the AEF as a whole,
but on the individual spirit and fighting capabilities of
the average American soldier.33
Colonel U.G. McAlexander, West Point class of 1887,
was known as a competent if not difficult commander; he
originally was with the 1st Division where he commanded the
18th Infantry. Major Jesse Woolridge, commanding company G,
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on the left of the Surmelin River and in front of the
Paris-Metz road, would later write of McAlexander as being
the “pre-eminent among the great battle leaders of all
time.”34 Companies H & E, along with Wooldridge’s G, held
the first delaying positions and were deployed along the
southern bank of the Marne. The first delaying position was
directly in front of the German 6th Grenadier Guard, 4th and
398th Infantries of the German 10th Division. As previously
mentioned the Germans used in their attack the
Stosstruppen, which constituted the 6th Grenadiers, Kaiser
Wilhelm’s favorite shock troops.35
Defense of the Surmelin Valley posed a difficult
problem and it was here that not only McAlexander but also
General Dickman would come into confrontation with the
sector commander, General DeGoutte. Dickman surmised the
best method of defending the valley, with its hills to the
east and west and flat ground near the northern approaches
to the Marne riverbank and Surmelin River, was with an
“elastic defense” as opposed to a defense-in-force tactic.
DeGoutte’s order to stand and fight was a surprise to
Dickman, for the French were the pioneers of the elastic
defense maneuver: a weaker force nearer the front which,
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when pressed to its limit of fighting capability, would
pull back toward the main force--further back---out of
enemy artillery range. Dickman, disobeying DeGoutte’s
orders, instead formed a defense in depth and, in order to
placate DeGoutte, slightly beefed up his very thin front
line. What really mattered to Dickman was positioning
troops on the hills of the valley, maintaining defensive
positions on the heights, and trusting his own judgment
about the defensive positions and postures of his men.36
Around midnight on 14-15 July Colonel Georg
Bruchmuller, chief of artillery for General von Hutier,
both of them famous for developing the offensive tactics
that had broken the trench stalemate, ordered artillery
fire to commence, whereupon 6,400 German guns
simultaneously sounded off. Gas shells whirred their way
toward the Allied rear trenches as high explosive (HE)
shells ground and pitted the earth up and down the Marne
Front. On the German right (McAlexander’s West), after an
approximately three hour artillery preparation had ended,
engineers and front line Soldaten began preparing to cross
the Marne, pulling river boats and rafts from concealed
positions. As Allied machine-gun fire intensified the
German shock troops, amassed in the woods for the first
36
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wave of the assault, witnessed Allied fire that at times
surpassed the fire of their own machine guns. In fact, the
officer commanding the German 5th Grenadier Regiment sent a
reconnaissance patrol to the front to assess the situation
of the Sturmstruppen in that sector near the Marne Front:
the 1st battalion of the 5th Grenadier Regiment, attacking
the American 3rd ID, had been severely reduced by intense
machine-gun fire as well as artillery and, as a result, a
crossing of the river there was deemed impossible. This was
a mere setback for the Germans, as the German 7th army
crossed the Marne and occupied the Allies’ first positions
on the front.37
Following the preemptive French artillery bombardment,
the German 6th Grenadier Regiment (of the German 10th
Division) at 0330 hours on 15 July attacked Woolridge’s G
Company along the river; first encountering stiff
resistance the German 6th Grenadiers, after an hour of
intense fighting with both Company G directly and indirect
machine-gun fire from the 30th Infantry Regiment, managed to
gain a foothold on the south bank of the Marne. In the
process Woolridge’s front platoon was all but destroyed.
The remnants of his forces pulled back and began a fighting
retreat to the railroad bank, when Woolridge moved up his
37
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reserve platoons and buttressed the forward positions.
Although G Company was forced back, the Germans paid a
heavy price as the 3rd ID machine-gunners literally
disintegrated the advancing German troops. Woolridge would
later boast of his soldiers’ accomplishments on killing the
enemy as the German advance switched from “a soldiers
maneuver into a military omelet.”38
The fifth offensive of Operation Michael would be the
final and most concentrated of the German assaults, the
last ditch effort of a desperate German army trying to
bring about a successful end to the war. Since March the
Germans had possessed the offensive and had badly
demoralized British and French troops; it seemed, at least
to Ludendorff and Hindenburg that if the German army was
successful in this last major assault chances of complete
victory would, at last, be at hand. Unlike their British
and French counterparts and to a degree the AEF, morale in
the German army reached a level not seen since the first
year of the war: this too would pass, and rather quickly.39
Major Guy I. Rowe commanded the Second Battalion, 38th
Infantry Regiment, of the Third Infantry Division during
the battle. A cool headed commander under fire,
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knowledgeable in his understanding of leading men into
battle and through fierce enemy opposition, Rowe was
respected by his commanders and revered by his
subordinates. Rowe believed it to be a useless task to try
and train men in the necessities of fine soldering “unless
confidence in the integrity of one another is developed at
the same time.”40
An excellent system as well as a smart way in which to
exert control over troops and operations, Major Rowe
required all his captains to write nightly reports of their
platoons’ locations and operations: from the bottom up,
McAlexander had complete control of the 38th Infantry
Regiment. Major Woolridge, from an excerpt in his book
concerning McAlexander's leadership skills, wrote that
“genius is knowing what to do next; knowledge is knowing
how to do it; and virtue is doing it.” He goes on to
explain what it was like during the opening phase of the
battle, when the Germans attacked:

Out of a night as black as the mouth of hell they
came. Eighty four German batteries…consolidated their
fire on the Surmelin valley for four solid hours, with
a fury never before equaled, according to French
observers, not even at Verdun. Gone were the [French
civilians]…fleeing before the scourge, with his high
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explosive, shrapnel, poison gas, thermite, machineguns and aeroplanes.41
The overall Allied command of the American 3rd ID was
under the French Sixth Army, commanded by General DeGoutte;
commanded by General Debeney the French XXXVIII Corps was
in direct command of the division near the front, in the
sector of Champagne-Marne. In its official history the
United States Army writes of the Champagne-Marne battle:

The heaviest attack fell on the front of the
American 3rd Division and the French division on its
right (the 125th) which were in line on the south bank of
the river, in and adjacent to the valley of the SURMELIN
[sic] Creek. The attack here was made by the German 10th
and 36th Divisions of the Seventh Army. They crossed the
river and drove back the French, and were able to make
but little progress against the American 6th Brigade,
which consisted of the 38th Infantry (McAlexander) and
the 30th Infantry (Butts). The 38th Infantry held its
ground close to the river, although assailed on three
sides at once. It has since been known as the Rock of
the Marne. Fighting on this front was fierce throughout
most of the day of July 15; on the 16th, offensive
operations ceased all along the front. Having failed to
capture REIMS or to hold their slight gains against the
American 3rd Division, the Germans on the next day, July
17, gave over the attack and began a withdrawal.42

In war there are, among others, battalion and platoon
movements, flank and counter-flank movements, lines being
constantly redrawn on maps, and generals who take the fight
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to the enemy. Also in war, on a more ‘bottom-up’, personal
level, there are men whom commit personal acts of bravery,
loyal and dedicated to their cause: as in previous American
wars, World War I was no different. They came from all
different parts of the U.S., spoke different languages, and
were of mixed cultures: all those men put forth the
character of the Doughboy in the blaze of battle. It is not
the generals who fight the battles but instead it is the
typical, average soldier; the young men who slug it out in
the fields and hills and forests, who fight wars. These are
the troops who determine the outcomes of battles, the
outcome of wars.
Woolridge, in Giants, wrote of “the American fighting
men in the heat of battle.” He wrote of men remaining at
their posts while all around them shells fell for hours,
the sound deafening and the impact of artillery shells
teeth shattering; soldiers on their bellies traversing
fields to silence enemy machine-gun activity; men wresting
weapons from the enemy and using the same weapons to
silence them. There were men like Private Dickman,
uncoordinated and spoke very little English, telling his
comrades “go ahead and shoot ‘em, they can’t hurt
you….Vatch, I get annoder”; and men like Sergeant Otto
Wolz, severely wounded by shrapnel as he tried to rescue a
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wounded comrade, remarking to his C.O. (before attempting
the rescue), “I will probably not make it in the face of
that [German] shelling, but I’ll try it for a pal.”43
Woolridge also writes of the bravery he witnessed of
enemy soldiers. As two U.S. soldiers were fighting on the
first line of the front they were charged by enemy troops.
One of the men was wounded in the head and the other was
trying to dress it when “a [German] charge came over the
top. Phillips seized Delsoldartos’ rifle and bayoneted a
Prussian officer, and then this officer…steadied his hand
by pressing his elbow on the ground and in his dying gasp
shot Phillips…through the brain.” Another account involved
Woolridge himself. As he ordered a German officer P.O.W. to
hand over his papers, the officer “holding his papers
beyond my reach slowly tore them to bits, all the while
looking me straight in the eye with never a flicker of his
eyelid….[The German P.O.W.] preferred to have his orders
taken that way than on demand.”44
As a contribution to the history of the 3rd ID, Captain
Fred S. Dever shared his experiences of the fighting at the
Marne. Commissioned a First Lieutenant in 1917, Dever
remained with the Third Division until the end of the war.
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While attached to the 38th Infantry, he was tasked to dig
trenches and construct wire defenses at the mouth of the
Surmelin River, in the area of Moulin. “When the German
bombardment began”, begins Dever, “we had no idea that the
enemy was attempting advance, believing that it was merely
a bombardment.” As hours passed---since the opening of
German artillery fire---the bombardment stepped forward to
the rear of the allied lines, to the rear of Devers’
forward position. Dever reported that a fellow Lieutenant
told him that “the Germans had crossed the Marne in front
of the 30th Infantry, with the result that the 30th had taken
a number of prisoners.” Dever continues:45

I then continued on toward Conningis, and, on
arriving at the Paroy-Crezancy road, I met a
soldier of the 30th….And he told me that the 30th
Infantry was having ‘A Hell of a lot [sic] of
fighting and taking a lot of prisoners….’I started
up on the road towards Mezy….I found Lieut. Gay and
about fifty men. He told me that the Germans had
crossed in force in front of the 30th. [sic] and
that he was afraid the 30th. Had been shot up pretty
bad, and quite a few taken [as] prisoners….During
the night of July 15-16 we were moved to billets
near St. Eugene and to the west of that town, where
I remained for a day or two, when I took up work
with the Detachment [sic] of policing the
battlefield.
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An undated, special report covers the events of the
3rd Division in its defense of the Marne as well as its
counterattack. The report begins with the German attack on
Chemin des Dames on 27 May, its success in overrunning
territory as far south as the Marne and the subsequent,
urgent actions taken by the Allies to halt the German
advance. On 29 May the 3rd Division, moving from its
training area from around Chateauvillian, took up forward
positions along the south bend of the Marne River. The 7th
Machine Gun Battalion of the 3rd Division was the first unit
on the scene, participating in action during the night of
31 May, around Chateau-Thierry; for three days and nights,
without reinforcement or supply, the 7th MG Battalion
eventually stopped the German advance.
In the days and weeks that followed, more units and
reinforcements arrived, such as the 4th, 7th, 30th, and 38th
Infantry Regiments; the 8th and 9th Machine Gun Battalions;
and the 10th, 18th, and 76th Field Artillery Battalions. In
support of this massive arsenal of firepower were the 5th
Forward Signal Battalion, 3rd Trench Mortar Battery, and the
6th Engineering Regiment. Also defending the line to the
east of the 3rd Division was a small number (soon enlarged)
of French corps artillery and half a French artillery
brigade: this seemingly meager artillery support covered a
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section of the front of over ten kilometers. The French
support, during July 1-14, were exponentially increased and
had a decisive affect on the morning of the 14th and 15th.46
The same report describes events following the initial
German attack on the morning of 14-15 July:

The German crossing was attempted a little
before five o’ clock on the morning of July 15, and
until dark that evening the destruction of the
German regiments designated to cross the River
[sic] at four different points between the towns of
GIAND and JAULGONNE [sic], constituted a continued
performance.
Although the rush of the German troops
overwhelmed some of the front-line positions, and
these units and the machine-gun companies in some
cases suffered a fifty percent loss, no German
soldier crossed the main road from FOSSOY to
CREZANCY, except as a prisoner of war, and by noon
of the following day there were no Germans in the
foreground of the 3rd Division Sector except the
dead.
During the days from July 16-19, the Division
[sic] remained in its sector on the Marne with its
right flank regiment facing to the east, as a
measure of self-protection against the German line
which had crossed the MARNE from the east side of
the JAULGONNE Bend to some point near CHATILLON.
Finally on the morning of July 20, three French
Divisions attacked the line only to find that the
enemy had retired to the north side of the Marne on
the previous night.

A report of 5 August 1918, written by Major Charles W.
Foster, states that “four general lines of defense had been
organized”, but constructed “in a rather elemental stage.”
46
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Notwithstanding the apparent weakness of the American
forward defensive line, divisional orders held fast that
all units must hold their respective positions and that any
lost ground must be immediately retaken through
counterattack. During the first part of July German
artillery batteries, as witnessed by American observers,
were receiving reinforcements. However, by the 14th, a
decrease had been noted by A.E.F. F.O.’s (Forward
Observers) that German artillery activity had decreased,
yet their infantry activity had increased: a sure sign of
imminent attack.47
Due to the German prisoners’ statements as to when the
attack would commence, on 14 July the 3rd Division’s
artillery opened up with a preemptive gas attack around
11:30 p.m.: aware the Germans would attack around midnight,
these preemptive bombardments were a definite necessity. At
the initial phase of the German bombardment, different
forms of gas were used: mustard gas was employed in the 3rd
Divisions rear areas while other forms of gas were used in
the forward areas where the German units would advance. A
report of 21 July 1918 by the 3rd Division’s gas officer,
Major W.M. Somervall, details the areas of the battlefront
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where the Germans dropped their gas ordinance and, just as
importantly, where they did not drop gas shells. Somervall
wrote of the gas attack:

No gas in appreciable quantities was used on
the slope toward the river Marne, and the few gas
shells reported north of the Plateau [sic] may be
considered accidents.
A count of shell holes in the shelled area
indicates that about 1000 gas shells per sq.
kilometer were used during the first three hours of
the bombardment.
Gases used were Diphosgene, Chlopierin, Yperite,
Diphenychloraraine, and Ethyldichlorarsine.
Mustard gas was used only on the area to the
rear….Lethal lachramatory gases were freely used,
however, in all rear areas.
Gas discipline in the various units was
excellent….Respirators were quickly adjusted, men
kept cool, and in spite of intense shelling with
gas, shrapnel and H.E., lasting over six hours, the
actual casualties were few.

Total American casualties due to gas attacks from 14
July through 20 July were 1,256. Somervall concludes that
considering the intensity and duration of the German gas
attack, that American troops were not entrenched, and the
fact that only a few dugouts were completed and
serviceable, “the showing of the division is very good---an
opinion concurred in by all observers who were on the
ground.”48
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In his preliminary report of 23 July Brigadier General
Crawford, commander of the 6th Brigade, 3rd I.D., stated that
up until around the first of July the German Air Force in
the Marne sector had little opposition, flying their
missions freely over the 30th Infantry’s area of operations.
The result was accurate German intelligence as to where to
concentrate their artillery fire; the 30th Division’s trench
fortifications and troops were subsequently fired upon with
deadly precision, as was the entire subsector of the
regiment. Crawford wrote of the fighting:

….When the attack began the defense was automatic
It was
a platoon commander’s fight….It would seem that
soon after the bombardment opened, midnight or five
minutes later, the enemy began his crossing
operations which was vigorously opposed all along
the front of the Brigade. Due to the configuration
of the ground the 38th Infantry was more successful
than the 30th in preventing the crossing so that not
as many crossed east of Mezy as did down the river
from that town.
It was a free for all fight with small units in the
dark, doing great execution to the enemy and throwing
his plans into complete confusion.
They [the Germans] attempted to organize their
mixed troops, but the frontal fire delivered by the
30thInfantry, the section of the units near the river,
and the fire from the heights above Moulins and the
slopes south produced as much confusion and dismay
that the Germans who were shock troops of the best
quality and highest spirits in the German Army
surrendered in groups of all sizes and individuals.
Resistance ceased, they threw down their arms and
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became anxious only that they be taken to the rear.49
Colonel T.M. Anderson, commander of the 7th Infantry
Regiment, on 17 July 1918 wrote a report praising one of
his officers, Lt. H.L. White, for heroic actions between
14-17 July. On the morning of the 16th Lt. White was ordered
“to take the 3rd Platoon of M Company and take up position
on the hill in front of Bois D’ Aigremont at all costs.”
Along the way White and his men found wounded Americans as
well as Germans, a swath of ground near Mezy strewn with
dead Germans, and two Maxim Guns. In one instance, as
German soldiers tried to cross the Marne in boats and over
bridges, they had to turn back because “the 7th Infantry’s
fire that turned loose on them was so hot that the enemy
could not hold their position.” All that and more occurred
during intense German artillery bombardment. In his report,
Lt. White wrote:

We have been under heavy shell fire from the Boche
ever since the night of the 14th, and have had nothing
to eat or drink, nor have we had any sleep since that
time. My men were exhausted and they sat down, not
being able to stand any longer, with their bayonets
toward the Boche and said: “Let them come.” They were
so weak they could not stand, but were there ready to
receive them when they arrived. Their orders were “To
hold at all costs” and they did hold.
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All the men on the front line were absolutely
exhausted. They have been put on the front line and
won’t move back at any cost. Corporal Brice, Company M
[7th Infantry Regiment], accompanied all patrols that
were sent out from my platoon and his work was very
commendable.

Lt. White goes on to describe the murderous artillery
of the Germans. Although the Americans were taking hundreds
of casualties due to exposure from a lack of trench
fortifications, he wrote that “This regiment has not only
held its ground, which it was told to hold at all costs,
but it has even taken over ground that was not expected of
it….I consider the action of this shell-torn and gasshattered regiment most commendable, even deserving of the
highest praise.”50
On 18 July an American patrol combing the woods just
south of Mezy where the Boche, attacking three days
earlier, were driven back revealed that approximately fivethousand German soldiers had been killed that first day of
battle. The German dead, piled three and four deep, was
proof to the Americans that men vs. machine-guns is a
struggle best left alone. If the ratio in World War I was
one killed for every four wounded, then the total number of
German casualties would likely have been 20,000. Even the
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Kaiser’s tough 10th Guard Division did not escape the wrath
of the 3rd Division: the entire 10th Guard, one of five that
attacked, engaged from across the Marne and but a few made
it back to their original position on the north bank.
German prisoners taken after the first day of battle
testified that an entire battalion of the 10th Guard was
destroyed and the remaining battalion was left with only
company strength.
One reason the Boche suffered such terrible losses on
the first day was that due to such large numbers of Germans
in the attack, the Americans pulled back into the woods
where they might better hold their position. Outwitting
their enemy, the Americans enticed German troops over
prearranged areas where small squads of men lay hidden in a
plethora of nests: as the Germans passed by the Americans
were able to open fire at will.
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Advancing from the region of Jaulgonne after intense
artillery bombardment five German divisions attacked the
Americans, advancing about two and a half miles in
approximately three hours. On the night of the fifteenth
American forces destroyed the German pontoon bridges and
took 1,500 prisoners, including an entire German Brigade
Staff. The French commander in the area, General DeGoutte
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(6th French Army), lauded the American troops after they
drove the Germans back to the railway that fringed the
Marne. The German attack on the fifteenth was launched in
territory where Attila, the dynamic Hun leader, met
disaster: the Catalunian Fields. The Germans chose that
territory for its straight roads, as they would be
imperative for their drive to Paris. As the Germans did in
1916 at Verdun they struck left and right, alternately, as
a means to overwhelm the enemy and reach Paris. The extreme
limits of the German offensive were in the west, in the
vicinity of Chateau-Thierry; in the east a fight with the
French---and the 28th Pennsylvania National Guard Division-raged at Main de Massiges. A French official made a
statement on 15 July concerning the day’s actions:

The German attack launched this morning at 4:30
o’clock continued throughout the day on both sides of
Rheims with equal violence. West of Rheims desperate
engagements were fought…south of the Marne, which the
enemy succeeded in crossing….A spirited counterattack
carried out by American troops drove back on the
right bank of the river enemy contingents….Between
Dormans and Rheims the Franco-Italian troops reacted
with tenacity….The enemy multiplied his efforts…in
the regions north of Prosnes and Souain, but was not
able, despite repeated attacks, to cut into our
combat positions.52
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Major Guy Rowe, commander of the Second Battalion of
the 38th Infantry Regiment, held a position just east of
Mezy on a stretch of railroad line. Resolved to hold the
line until the last man Captain Jesse Woolridge, under
Rowe’s command, assembled a command of approximately two
hundred men and took position among the rocky terrain of
Mezy. Three counterattacks later he managed to detain
around three hundred German prisoners. Directly east of
Woolridge was the 125th French division which, soon after
the first indications of an all out German assault,
retreated for about five miles to the south. When doing so
they failed to inform the members of the (attached)
American 28th Division. Many from the 28th were killed or
taken prisoner that day. It is no wonder they earned the
nickname the ‘Bleeding Keystone Division’.53 As a result of
the French retreat the German 36th Division in that sector
captured Varennes and continued their southward advance
until finally stopped by Co. F of the 38th Infantry
Regiment. Now being attacked from not only their frontal
and western flanks, the 38th Infantry Regiment also had to
contend with a German assault on their eastern flank.
Surrounded, the 38th would fight it out with the Boche until
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finally withdrawing and reorganizing their companies to
continue the fight another day.54 Kurt Hesse, a soldier in
the German 5th Grenadier Regiment, wrote of the days events.
After being assured on 30 May by the Kaiser that “To-morrow
[sic] we shall march on Paris”, Hesse wrote of the reality
of the situation on the Marne that day:

Scarcely ever have I experienced such a dark
night as the one from July 14th to 15th….The air
filled with gas. The hardships for our men were
enormous…. At last! A mad artillery fire
started….The enemy had begun [artillery
bombardment]….No word has come yet, if the
crossing has succeeded….The attack has halted. A
strong enemy prevents farther advance….The
[artillery] striking in the forest is terrible,
nerve-racking….Put on the gas masks! One could not
see anything before---now still less! Many are
seized with a dull despair.

He continues describing the events of those terrible
days in mid-July: Gas, deafening artillery, black of night
being lighted up from high explosive shells, and the
screams of his wounded and dying comrades. He and his
comrades hoped for a rest because “A day like the 15th of
July affects body and nerves for weeks”, and the

…infinitely dear comrades we had left over there
[on the other side of the Marne]. Many of them we had
not been able to lay in the earth….Then the report
54
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reached us: trouble to the right. The enemy,
enormously strong, has attacked from the woods of
Villers-Cotterets….We must go back.55
The casualties sustained by the 38th on the first day
of fighting accounted for about 25 percent of the entire
divisional strength; it is a tribute to the overall command
of the division that the number of casualties were not
greatly increased. Pershing would later write that “a
single regiment of the Third Division wrote one of the most
brilliant pages in the annals of military history in
preventing the crossing [of Germans] at certain points on
its front, while on either side the Germans, who had gained
a footing, pressed forward.” From the French command the
38th received the Croix de Guerre as well as a citation,
which read:56

A superior regiment which, under the energetic and
able command of its chief, Colonel McAlexander, gave
proof of unshakeable tenacity in the course of the
German onset of the 15th of July, 1918. Attacked in
front and outflanked on the right and left for several
kilometers, it remained, in spite of everything, on the
bank of the Marne, faithful to its mission, and
repulsed the enemy, superior in number, taking from him
more than two hundred prisoners.
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As of 16 July 1918 along the American lines on the
Marne, the Kaiser’s troops in some places were held back
and in other places were completely repulsed, retreating to
their original positions. The German pursuit of their
overall objective, Paris, let alone gaining much ground
toward that end, was all but halted. Counterattacks by the
allies to the southwest of Jaulgonne retook territory the
Germans had taken just one day prior; territory in the
Marne sector changed sides many times since the first day
of battle. During the fifth and final offensive of
Operation Michael German troop morale was at a steady
decline: since the 15th the Germans were repeatedly beaten
back, were suffering enormous losses, and had no hope for
reinforcements. Germany’s manpower had run out; in the area
of the Marne, the German High Command’s plan had seemingly
run its course.
Chateau-Thierry was the point at which the Germans had
hoped to pivot their forces and move westward toward Paris.
As of 16 July not only had they failed to achieve that
swing but, moreover, were driven back to their original
lines of departure, just north of the Marne River. Edwin L.
James, in an article of 17 July 1918 in the New York Times,
writes of the individual heroism that the American fighting
man possessed:
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Nineteen [Americans] of a platoon were left in a
certain position. There they stayed…until all their
ammunition was gone. Then…they leaped forward with
fixed bayonets and charged the German machine guns. The
[German] crews took one glance at those bayonets…and
stepped out into the open, hands above their heads,
yelling ‘Kamerad!’ The nineteen [Americans] brought
them back; there were thirty-eight of them [German
P.O.W.’s].

Also on the 16th many more German prisoners were taken
as the American army on the Marne counterattacked. From St.
Agnon-La Chapelle the Americans pushed the German forces
back a little over a mile. At the southward bend in the
Marne, between Fossoy and Joulgonne, the German forces had
been routed and the area cleaned of all enemy opposition.
Just south of the river, where the railroad parallels the
bend of the Marne, American artillery and airplanes
destroyed all remaining German troops within that sector of
fighting; breaking all that was left of German resistance,
the Americans east of Reims, in conjunction with the French
forces in that sector, helped to further stabilize the
precarious situation on that front. James continues writing
that “There is no equal in France for the American soldier
at close range, and that is how the foe must meet him in
the days to come.” The American fighters are individuals
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and “They never quit. As a German General reported to the
Crown Prince…they ‘kill or are killed.’”57
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CHAPTER 3
FINAL BATTLES

As the Second Battle of the Marne came to an end
another was just beginning: The Aisne-Marne operation that
raged from 18 July to 6 August 1918. Marshal Foch, fully
aware of the progress the Germans had made in the Champagne
sector, planned for a French-A.E.F. attack to be conducted
on the western bank of the Marne Salient, on the Boche
lines between the Marne and the Aisne.

If the Germans lost

their principal railroad and Soissons, thereby losing their
supply of weapons and equipment supporting their positions
along the Marne (south) and Aisne (north), they would be
forced to pull back from the western front of the Marne
Salient. Marshal Petain would lead the attack and, if
successful, would thereby officially end the German threat
of taking Paris. The mission of the 3rd ID, by 18 July
holding a position from Fossoy to the west and extending to
Launay to the east, was to prevent the Germans’ passage of
the Marne and protect the Surmeiln Valley from any further
German incursion.
The French opened on 18 July what some have dubbed
‘the beginning of the end’ for Germany’s military forces,
and the war. The XX French Corps led the attack from the
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Red Forest and, moving east, five days later the objective,
the Soissons-Chateau Thierry highway, was taken. In vain,
though swift and determined, the Germans moved forward
thousands of disciplined, experienced troops. Perhaps
unaware of the great opportunity available to him, Foch’s
counter-offensive on the 18th was superb from the start.
There were two main reasons the offensive was so
successful: the first was that the commander of the German
7th Army, General Max von Boehm, was expecting the attack to
come from the south and, second, the German communications
were parallel to their forward position, exactly what the
French had destroyed.58 Contributing in the French westward
attack was the American IV Corps, commanded by Major
General Robert Lee Bullard, comprised of the 1st and 2nd
Divisions. Also taking part in the attack was the 1st
Moroccan Division as well as the French 58th and 69th
Divisions.59
On 21 July the 3rd ID reported that the Germans were
retreating along their entire front. During this time the
divisions’ mission was to cross the Marne, gain contact
with the Germans and inflict as many losses and casualties
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as possible, and continue forcing the Germans to retreat.60
The division continued in this manner, contacting and
engaging the enemy as they pushed northwestward, throughout
July and into early August.61 The 3rd was subsequently
ordered on 12 July to Grodencourt, where it exercised
training and maneuver operations, as well as recuperated;
on 4 September it was transferred to Vaucoulers until
finally, on 10 September 1918, the 3rd ID moved into the
line as reserves in support of the 42nd (Rainbow), the 1st,
and the 89th American Divisions. On 11 September the A.E.F.,
for the first time, fought as an entirely independent army
commanded only by American officers: St Mihiel, unbeknownst
at the time, was America’s opening act for future
engagements on the European continent.62
It is of interest to note that around this time
General Ludendorff no longer had confidence in his troops.
The failed Michael Offensive, the Germans’ defeat of 15-17
July, and the subsequent retreat throughout July and August
demoralized his exhausted soldiers: his Sturmstruppen were
all but annihilated during the spring offensives and what
was left were soldiers less disciplined and of lower
60

J.W. Stewart, “Operations, July 14-30, 1918,” RG 120, National Archives.
U.S. Department of The Army: Office of Military History, United
States Army in The World War, 1917-1919, vol. 5 (Washington, D.C.: GPO,
1948), 597-616.
62
“St. Mihiel Operations: August 10, 1918 to September 16, 1918,”
RG 120, National Archives.
61

58

morale. Marshal Paul von Hindenberg, as a means to
invigorate and rally his army, issued an address on 6
September 1918. It reads, in part:

We are in the midst of a heavy battle with the
foe. If numerical superiority alone were to
guarantee victory, then Germany would long since
have been crushed to the ground. The enemy knows,
however, that Germany and her allies can never be
vanquished by arms alone.
….In the east we have forged peace, and in the
west we are strong enough to do the same despite
the Americans. But we must be strong and united.
Why does the enemy incite colored races
against the German soldiers? Because he wishes to
annihilate us.
The enemy also endeavors to sow dissension in
our ranks…leaflets dropped from aeroplanes….There
have always been some traitors in the
Fatherland….Most of these now reside in neutral
countries…to escape being executed as traitors.
Be on your guard, German soldiers.63

The St. Mihiel assault of 12 September saw a unified,
U.S. commanded offensive with French troops---for the first
time---being led by American officers into battle. Fivehundred thousand Americans supported by one-hundred
thousand French troops battled back German soldiers for
fifteen miles, to just south of Verdun: Pershing’s earlier
insistence on individual, open-area fighting proved to be
correct. Capturing German strongholds well ahead of
schedule, the A.E.F.’s offensive disrupted the German
63
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retreat to such an extent that Allied commanders argued
that only by continuing the assault could they achieve a
major breakthrough: continuing the assault on confused
German soldiers would deny them any chance of reorganizing
their defenses. The seemingly endless list of problems that
earlier in 1917 strained American leadership seemed to
disappear; the U.S. Army, apparently, had overcome its
earlier problems of training, supply, and logistics. The
St. Mihiel Salient, that territory in France known as the
Woevre,64 was taken. The first truly American operation was
a complete success.65
By the night of 13 September the St. Mihiel operation
was essentially over, as the last remaining pockets of
German resistance were being eliminated; the salient was
sealed earlier in the day and all remaining enemy troops
therein had been killed on taken as prisoners of war. On 16
September 1918 the battle for the St. Mihiel Salient was
officially over. The operation was so successful and the
loss of American troops so little, it is arguable that the
push could have successfully continued forward and the
German lines of communication taken out at Briey. However,
Allied plans called for those same American divisions so
64
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successful in the St. Mihiel drive to be committed to the
next operation, the Meuse-Argonne.66 However successful the
St. Mihiel operation had been at driving the enemy back,
German artillery and air power was still very active. Up to
this point the First American Army had suffered
approximately 100,000 casualties: fighting in heavily
wooded areas and against strongly held trenches and
fortifications made unavoidable such losses.
The biggest battle the American Army fought during the
war was the Meuse-Argonne campaign: an area from just west
of Verdun to a little east of Soissons. Extraordinary
efforts involved superb planners, and the movement of
troops---a shift of over forty miles from the St. Mihiel
Front to a sector northwest paralleling the west bank of
the Meuse---and supplies fell to the responsibility of the
Operations Officer of the First Army, Colonel George C.
Marshall. Completed in just under two weeks, the move was
as bold as it was remarkable: over only three roads and
confined to the cover of darkness, 600,000 American,
220,000 French and Italian troops as well as 3,000 guns and
40,000 tons of supplies made their way to the west bank of
the Meuse. Marshall Foch’s objective was clear: cutting the
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essential German rail lines and forcing them back, across
the Hindenburg Line, inside their own territory by the end
of the year.67
The Americans went ‘over the top’ at 5:30 a.m. on 26
September: the First American Army in the center, III Corps
in the east, and I Corps to the west. In support of I Corps
was the fledgling 1st Tank Brigade, commanded by Lt. Colonel
George S. Patton. This was the first time tanks had been
used in such difficult conditions. The French small, twoman Renaults and a few of the heavier French Schneider’s
provided infantry support, as Patton advanced the tank
force as an independent dimension of warfare: the tanks
were to be used in a concentrated fashion in support of
infantry rather than piecemeal amongst individual infantry
units.68
After a brief setback, the 1st Tank brigade managed to
destroy the German machine-guns; eventually, due to
mechanical troubles and enemy action, the strength of the
force was severely reduced. Although a minor one, the 1st
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Tank Brigade did indeed play a part in the general fighting
in the Meuse-Argonne.69
The first phase of the campaign planned for an axis of
attack on the line Mountfacon-Romagne-Buzancy: if
successful the Germans, after being pushed back in the
center by American Third, Fifth, and First Corp’s, would
have to retreat from the Argonne without the burden of
having the Americans to attack and clear such difficult
terrain. Relentlessly the U.S. forces attacked and on the
second day Mountfacon was taken, while in the Argonne
American forces were encountering tenacious German
resistance. During the battle the 3rd ID replaced the 79th ID
and was forced to direct a frontal assault against a
determined, hostile enemy: subjected to artillery and
cross-fire the Americans, especially those in the center
positions, suffered heavily.70 It is debatable that, had the
veteran 3rd ID been rotated earlier into the front line,
Mountfacon would have fallen on the first day: if the
divisions’ combat reputation theretofore held weight---“it
may be killed but it cannot be conquered”---it likely would
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have suffered heavy, heavy casualties.
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Writing of the

battle that day, General Pershing reported that

The assault of 26 September surprised the
Germans and disrupted their defense, but this
situation was only momentary. From that day on
the fighting was probably unsurpassed during the
World War for dogged determination on both sides.
Each foot of ground was stubbornly contested and
hostile troops took advantage of every available
spot from which to pour enfilade and crossfire
into the advancing American troops….72

3 October 1918 marked the second phase of the MeuseArgonne struggle. Honed by experience the Americans knew
that it was the second assault against the by now
reinforced, after a few days’ lull in the fighting,
fortified enemy that would require the hardest fighting.
Supported by numerous French tank battalions the 3rd ID
launched its attack on 4 October, its objectives being Bois
de Ogons, Bois de Cunel, and the heights just east of
Romagne. By 11 a.m. Bois de Cunel had been reached but not
taken; heavy German machine-gun fire halted the Americans,
and communications were hampered due to weather and human
error. German planes machine-gunned the 30th Infantry
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Regiment as it tried to move forward, although two of the
planes were shot down by superbly accurate small-arms fire.
The forward line of the 3rd ID continued to advance
slowly on 5 October: bitter and stubborn German resistance
slowed their advance, particularly in the area of Bios de
Cunel. An Adjutant of the 5th Brigade, 3rd ID, reported that
“Three times the infantry tried to advance across the field
into Bois de Cunel, and each time the line melted away.
This space was thoroughly covered by machine gun [sic]
fire.”73
On 7 October the 4th Infantry Regiment, 3rd ID,
discontinued its direct assault on the Bois de Cunel,
instead reorganizing for an attack in the northern edge of
the Argonne: after three gallant attempts on 6 October,
under deadly machine-gun fire, to overrun the Bois de
Cunel, the twenty or so men of Company C (same regiment)
were withdrawn for a later attack on the Bois de Beuge.
Throughout the 7th and 8th American artillery continued to
barrage the enemy: rolling barrages harassed the German
positions from just south of the Bois de Cunel and
continued in a northerly direction past the Germans’
Mamelle Trench Line. Men from the 30th and 38th Infantry
Regiments were sent forward and suffered heavy casualties
73
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from German machine-gun fire; the 38th Regiments line was
now only a mere seventy-five yards from the German line.
High Explosive shells and Phosgene gas was used on the
German line: units of the 3rd ID were finally able to
overcome the Germans and take on the 9th the Mamelle Trench
as well as the Bois de Cunel. As the 3rd advanced slowly
under heavy machine-gun fire they finally crossed the
Hindenburg Line on 9 October 1918: that windy, elongated
honeycomb of defenses, so easily defended due to the
rolling ground and the ability of the Germans to use such
terrain, was breached.
11 October brought renewed American attacks that,
while no immediate material signs were made, continued to
further demoralize, strain, and exhaust a retreating German
Army. American lines were improved and prisoners taken:
interrogation reports determined that entire regiments of
the German Army were dissipating in the face of the
American onslaught. By the morning of 12-13 October the 3rd
ID had secured a line from Cirges-Romagne Road to a
position very near the Meuse River.74
After forty-seven days of intense combat involving
over one-million American troops, suffering 117,000
casualties, the Americans pushed back forty-three German
74
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divisions over a distance of thirty miles, capturing over
400 enemy guns and killing or wounding over 120,000 German
troops.75
The war did not go quietly: the final six months of
the war were worse that the previous years of constant
stalemate as the men had, finally, come out of the
trenches. Hostilities officially ended on 11 November 1918
and the Germans on 28 June 1919 signed the Treaty of
Versailles, exactly five years to the day Archduke Franz
Ferdinand was assassinated by a Serbian’s bullet. A total
of 9,469,982 Americans would serve during the war: the U.S.
suffered 116,516 deaths and another 204,002 casualties.
53,402 were battle deaths and more than 63,000 deaths were
categorized as “other deaths”.76 The war in the United
States was quickly forgotten, however, and remains the
first ‘forgotten war’ of 20th Century U.S. history.
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